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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case gravitates around an undisputed Contractwherein
Apple's agreed to buy O'Dell's catering equipment in July, 2001,
with the purchase price of $340,000.00 secured by the equipment.
See Verified

Complaint, Clerk's Record on Appeal, [CRA], CRA p.1

and p. 65, section 9, Plaintiff's Affidavit of David Orr; CRA
p.224, District Court's Memorandum Decision].

Then, claiming a

"Modification" to the original agreement occurred, Respondent's
Complaint purports that the acceptance and cashing of check no.
469 marked 'final payment" on June 10, 2003, perfected an Accord
And Satisfaction, CIiA Verified Complaint 14, reducingthe
purchase price some $165,000.00, at Respondent's

verified

Complaint at CRA 3 , line 11.
However, the facts in this case developed to show that
Respondent failed to provide any competent evidence that the
Appellant actually received the check, necessary for notice of an
Accord and Satisfaction; instead, it is clear itself from the
examination of the check, that the check itself was presented at
the Respondent's bank in Ketchum, Id, for a direct bank transfer.
See Affidavit of Appellant Thomas O'Dell, p. 180, CRA, denying
receipt of the check.

There in fact was no Accord and

Satisfaction, as Appellant had no proper notice of the check
served nor delivered upon him.
See also Appellant's

Exhibit A, p. 41, showing on the back

of the check a stamp from the Ketchum Branch, Ketchum Idaho, and
scrawlings, yet to be identified as to signator "For Deposit
APPLE'S
BRIEF
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Only"

showing patently from the back of the check that the check

was not mailed to Appellant, but that an attempt was made at an
Accord through the writing on the face.

See also a document at

p. 155, CRA, entitled ~laintiff's/[Respondent's]Exhibit C,
purporting to be mailed to Mr. Thomas O'Dell, Arco, Idaho", no
zip code.
To support it's decision the District court relied
exclusively upon the affidavit of Respondent David Orr for
Apple's Mobile Catering, "that he had problems with the
equipment, and to resolve the issue, he and Mr O'Dell made an
oral modification to their original agreement".

CRA Memorandum Decision, p. 225.

Emphasis added.

See affidavit of Tom O'Dell, p.

1, flatly denying that he had ever seen nor personally received

check No. 469 from David W. Orr, listing a purported "Final
Payment" designation for that $15,000.00 check, CRA, 180, and
that he never actually saw the check until sometime in 2006.
This denial should have created a genuine issue of material fact
as to the existence of any "oral Modification" so that O'Dell's
sales price would be reduced by $165,000.00. Instead, the Court
summarily, but improperly, finds the Modification through some
Course of Performance.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Respondent

originally filed this Case in Bingham County

and asserted some elements of an Accord and Satisfaction as his
main theory he had satisfied Apple's Mobile Catering's
contractual obligations to Appellant, but a change of Venue
Stipulation properly removed the case to Custer County, where the
Appellant has always lived and done business.

It is noteworthy

that the assertion of an Accord and Satisfaction by Respondent
procedurally places a Defense of an Accord and Satisfaction as a
method of discharging contract or cause of action defense as the
gravamen of their case in chief. This position anticipates
Appellant's assertion of the contract and the Statute of Frauds
requirement for a writing, placing it squarely in Respondent's
case in chief, and subjecting his case to those defenses
affirmatively.
The Appellant's Answer of January 4 t h , 2 0 0 8 , was followed by
a period of delays caused by Appellant's two Bankruptcy filings
and the Automatic Stay Granted thereon, the first of January
30th, 2 0 0 8 [ when Appellant filed his first Bankruptcy Petition

through the office of this attorney, and the second pro se filing
by Mr. O'Dell on June 23rd, 2 0 0 8 , after dismissal of the first
case.

See p. 166, Appellant's Objection To Notice of Admissions

Deemed Admitted, line 4.1
The Appellant, not aware of the pro se Bankruptcy filing of
his client, filed his first Motion and Memorandum for Summary
Judgment on June 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 , and the Court got the case back on
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v. THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S
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track following the August 20, 2008 dismissal of the second
Bankruptcy, and called up the case for calendaring On August
27'"

2008, with the court Ordering the parties to complete

filing Summary Judgment by October 15th, 2008.
The Respondent filed its motion for Summary Judgment on
September 12, 2008, and Appellant stood upon his June 30m, 2008,
filing of Summary Judgment.

Respondent filed it's reply

Memorandum is Support of It's Motion for Summary Judgment on
October 9th, 2008, CRA 169-173, and Appellant Filed it's
Responsive Memorandum on October 28, 2008.

On November 18'",

2008 court issued its Decision Re: Pending Summary Judgment

Motions.

On December 2"',

2008, Appellant filed it's Motion to

Set Aside the Court's Ruling On Summary Judgment, and on December
16, 2008, the Court filed it's Order Denying Defendant's Motion

to Consider, from which this Notice of Appeal issued on January
28. 2009.

APPLE'S
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO THE PLAINTIFF, WHEN IN FACT FROM THE FACE OF THE DECISION, THE
COURT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION, APPEARING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

11. DO SUFFICIENT FACTS EXIST FOR WHICH A REASONABLE JURY
COULD FIND BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WAS A
COURSE OF PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?

APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A Motion for Summary Judgment may be granted "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56

(

c

)

Idaho Code Section 28-2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS- STATUTE OF
FRAUDS. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract
for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.

Idaho Code Section 28-2-202. FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION.-PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms with respect to which the
confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are
otherwise set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be
explained or supplemented
(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade (section 28-1-303); and
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
IV.
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND
WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing, cannot be otherwise
modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants, such a
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be signed by
the other party. (3) The requirements of the Statute of Frauds
section of this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if
the contract as modified is within it's provisions.
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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ARGUMENT
I.
I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO

THE RESPONDENT, WHEN IN FACT FROM THE FACE OF THE DECISION, THE
COURT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF AN' ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION, APPEARING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT?

.

Pursuant to Rule 56

(

c

)

of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be granted "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."
The party opposing the motion for summary judgment has the
burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish whether a
triable issue of fact exists; however, the Court must construe
all facts in favor of the party opposing the motion, together
with all reasonable inferences derived from the evidence.
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171
(1986); Bunker Hill Co. v. United Steelworkers, 107 Idaho 155,
686 P.2d 835 (1984); Mitchell v. Siquieros, 99 Idaho 396, 582
P.2d 1074 (1978).

Based upon the failure of Respondent to

prevail upon his main theory of Accord and Satisfaction, the
Court should have granted Summary Judgment to the Appellant,
declaring the Respondent owed the unpaid balance of the contract.

APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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However, in it's Memorandum Decision of November 18, 2008,
the court relies exclusively upon the Affidavit of David Orr for
it's decision, and completely fails to address the Affidavit of
Thomas O'Dell, flatly denying he personally received check No.
469 from David W. Orr, listing a "Final Payment" See p. 180,

Affidavit of Thomas O'Dell, and any awareness of and contract
modification.
Appellant in it's motion for Summary Judgment of June 30th,
2008

mainly focused on Respondent's theory of Accord and

Satisfaction, as no alternative theory had yet emerged from
Respondent's pleadings.

Then the Statute of Frauds Issue was

argued again in the Appellant's Responsive Memorandum Supporting
Motion for Summary Judgment Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
11.

CRA, p. 185.

DO SUFFICIENT FACTS EXIST FOR WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD

FIND BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WAS A COURSE
OF PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?
The district Court, however, has never properly address the
Statute of Frauds.

It is clear, however, this case is governed

by the Statute of Frauds, as a $130,000 modification has been
asserted by the Respondent.

The statute merely requires that a

Contract for the Sale of Goods over $500.00 must be in writing to
be enforceable, by way of action or defense, unless signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought.
Idaho Code Section 28-2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS- STATUTE OF
FRAUDS. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract
for the sale oE goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.

~t is apparent from the early development in this case that
Respondent was aware of this requirement, and sought to remedy it
with an Accord and Satisfaction, that they knowingly attempted
this as a remedy.

See Respondent's Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Support of Its Motions For Summary Judgment, CRA 105, footnote
one. On this point, there is an obvious factual dispute, as the
Respondent argues and admits he made some payments by "direct
ave Apples his account
deposit to the Defendant's bank account ...g
number and Mr. Orr would at times go to a branch of Defendant's
bank and deposit the finds in Defendant's Account", and that his
habit was to mail to Defendant by first class mail a copy of the
check that Mr. Orr deposited.

See CRA p. 112. citing David W.

Orr Affidavit, paragraph 15.
Compare this directly with the Affidavit of Appellant Thomas
O'Dell "[tlhat I am the Defendant in this matter, but that
Plaintiff's assertion in section ( 7 ) of the complaint is totally
false and without merit, in that I never saw, nor personally
received check No. 469 from David W. Orr, listing a purported
"Final Payment" designation for that $15,000 check".

CRA, p. 180

No summary Judgment is proper, if there is a genuine issue of
material fact, so the court found an alternative theory and based
it's decision upon oral modification of a written contract. But
if a contract is within the statute of Frauds, there is still a
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v . THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S
BRIEF
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writing requirement for it's modification.

See especially:

Note that the following code section should have routed the
Court's inquiry into whether or not the contract, as modified, is
within the provisions of 28-2-201. It is.
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND
WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or
rescission except by a signed writing, cannot be otherwise
modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants, such a
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be signed by
the other party. (3) The requirements of the Statute of Frauds
section of this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if
the contract as modified is within it's provisions. Emphasis
added.
In the Court's Memorandum decision the Court also argues
that Respondent's affidavit is not evidence, declining to see
Respondent's "legal assertion that the written contract could not
be modified orally" CRA 226, and disregards Respondent's view of
the terms.

The court failed to recognize there were conflicting

inferences to be made from the reading and comparison of the
affidavits of the parties, and left this decision to the jury.
This is supported by the case law on this point at Loomis v. City
of Hailev, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), Bonz v. Sudweeks,
119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991) and Aid Ins. Co. (Mut. Aid
Ins. Co. V. Armstroncr), 119 Idaho 897, 811, P.2d 507 (Ct. App.

Respondents denial of any oral modification and denial of an
Accord and Satisfaction is a matter of record ignored by the
District Court.

If the record contains conflicting inferences or

reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary

APPLE'S
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judgment must be denied.

Loomis v. City of Haiiev, 119 Idaho

434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), supra.

This clearly means that the court may not just rely upon the
affidavit of one party as Respondent's affidavit has been totally
ignored by the court, especially when the lower court tried to
then show a

"mutual assent . . . implied from the parties' actions."

"Even if a contract has a clause requiring modifications to be in
writing, such a clause can be waived, either expressly or based
upon the conduct of the parties."

M E M O W U M DECISION, CRA, 225.

But this is not permitted by the law and a literal violation of
the Parol Evidence Rule, below.
Idaho Code Section 28-2-202. FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION.-PAROLE OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms with respect to which the
confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are
otherwise set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be
explained or supplemented:
(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade (section 28-1-303); and
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Emphasis

added.
It must be argued the court did find the writing to have
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement, and improperly then went on to find this
section somehow waived; from the courts own language, again "Even
if a contract has a clause requiring modifications must be in
writing, such a clause can be waived, either expressly or based
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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upon the conduct of the parties," and the Court looks to the
Course of Performance exception to the Statue of Frauds. CRA p.
225 See also Affidavit of Thomas O'Dell, notifying the court of
such a clause and referencing Defendant's Exhibit B, Orr Security
Agreement.
At this point the Court should have seen it was looking to
"evidence of additional terms by course of performance,
prohibited by this section because the writing was intended by
the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement," absolutely prohibited by Idaho Code 22-2-202 (b)
[somehow neither this agreement nor the original contract has
appeared in the Clerks Record on Appeal].
This argument was presented to the court again in
Respondent's Motion to set aside Court's Ruling on Summary
Judgment. CRA p. 230. Appellant there argued unsuccessfully
that where there is conflicting evidence the court may not enter
summary Judgment; in addition, the where the burden of proving
the doctrine of part performance to provide an exception to the
Statute of Frauds, Idaho Courts require proof by Clear and
Convincing evidence.

See Boesiser v. Frier, 85 Idaho 551, 381

P.2d 802 (1963).
At the very least the District Court should have retained
the case on for Jury trial until this material fact had been
decided, as this code section appears to make it mandatory the
court so find, in construing the related statutes to the basic
Statute of Frauds.

The court completely overlooked this further

APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v. THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S
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analysis, instead focusing on the course of performance exception
at section (a).

The District court should on remand clearly

address this issue.

It is blatantly apparent from Mr. O'Dell's

affidavit that this was his intent, and to then see the lower
court use the unilateral assent of merely one of the parties to
show a course of performance to improperly modify a contract
otherwise subject to the Statute of Fraud's requirement for a
writing is unconscionable and illegal.
Note in the construction of the Statute how it compels the
court to make such an inquiry, as that whole two part section may
be read "[tlerms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda
of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented:

(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade (section 28-1-303); and
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Emphasis
added.
Idaho Code 28-2-202, the Parol Evidence Rule. If in fact the
court is arguing, as it appears to, that such a clause can be
waived, either expressly or based upon the conduct of the parties
at CRA 225 in it's Memorandum Decision, the requirements of

APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC
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section b, supra, appear to prevent that here, as if . . . "unless
the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreementn.
Finally, the court should have considered all these code
sections related to this issues in making it's decision, and this
one was also completely omitted from the District Court's
analysis at Idaho Code Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209.
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209
MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement
which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed
writing, cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as
between merchants, such a requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be signed by the other party. (3) The requirements
of the Statute of Frauds section of this chapter (section 28-2201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within it's
provisions. Emphasis added.
Again and again and again all the related code sections of
the Uniform Commercial Code, from the Statute of Frauds at 28-2201, to the Parol Evidence Rule at 28-2-202, to the section at
28-2-209 on Modification, Rescission and Waiver. As the stated
purpose and policy of the code is to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions, Idaho Code
28-1-103, and as the combined effect of these three or four
prohibitions against a modificationall appear to require a
writing on the part of the Appellant not extant in this case, and
a fatal defect in the Respondents case overlooked by the District
Court below
The Court of Appeals of Idaho agrees.

In Breeden v. Edmunson,

689 P.2d 211, 107 Idaho 319,(Court of Appeals 19841, holding that

APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v. THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S OPENING
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the section on Modification at Idaho Code 28-2-209 requires that
any modification of the parties written agreement be in writing,
quoting the operative language from section 28-2-209 which
provides "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of
this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract
as modified is within its provisions.
This appears to be, again, back to the basic Statute of
Frauds argued here from Idaho Code 28-2-201, a contract over
$500.00. Most interesting in the Court's analysis is also the
presentation of the situation here, that although '[ilt was not
addressed by the court below . . . Iblecause of the way the issue was
presented to us, both sides have not had the same opportunity to
brief and argue the issue to us.

For these reasons, we will

allow the parties to present the issue to the trial court hearing
this case on remand.
dispositive.

It is a critical issue which may be

It should be decided before any retrial is held."

Id, supra, p. 324.

It is also most noteworthy this decision

deprived Breeden to the earlier award of attorney's fees, as "the
court did not reach that issue because of the need to remand.
When the other issues are decided below, the court can determine
entitlement to attorney fees under the provisions of the note.
Id, 324.
There can be no more material fact than this blatant
dispute, one party asserting the Notice requirement for an Accord
and Satisfaction had been met by his habit and practice to mail
the check, and the other flatly denying that fact.

See
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especially on the credibility of the Respondent when he
conveniently writes: "Dear Tom: Please find enclosed a copy of my
final payment check

#469

for $15,00 for all equipment contained

within Apples Mobile Catering."

The letter is addressed to Mr.

O'Dell In Arco, Idaho; this court should take Judicial Notice
that this is not proper service or notice, as there is not even a
proper address as might have been done through a General
Delivery. Not having a trial deprives all opportunities at cross
examination to Appellant, besides being inconsistent with the
rules cited.
The Appellant, also, is in Custer County and at all times
relevant to these issues, and as evinced by Respondent's own
"affidavit" at page 47 CRA, from the Bankruptcy filing, showing
the Appellant's residences for the past 8 years, all in Custer
County, Mackay, Idaho, and that at the time of the filing of the
has resided at 501 South Main, Mackay Idaho 83251.

This clearly

contradict his own exhibit C, p. 155 CRA, which purports to show
attempts at notice; this is not even a Good Faith Attempt at
that, as Appellant has always been in Custer County, and the
letter in this exhibit is mailed to an address only reading Arco,
Idaho; but this red flag warning is completely ignored by the
trial court.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's

Motion for Summary

Judgment should properly have been granted against Respondent's
complaint for delivery of the titles and for the Respondent to
APPLE'S
BRIEF
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pay Appellant the balance due on the contract; Respondent's
Motion for summary Judgment should have been denied, and the
decision by the lower Court granting summary judgment should be
reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with thed
arguments set forth herein.
L> c

DATED this&
O

day of June, 200

Attorney for ~ ~ p e l l a n t s
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